Teknema 5 / "Energy and Chance"/ Fall 1999

Place, Energy and Rhythm
On Energy without Movemen

Victoria Allen

The intention of this paper is to try to understand whether it would be possible for a philosophy of energy to exist autonomously, if "energy" is potentially read without a configuration of movement. To consider this, the paper will undertake a journey without prior knowledge of destination, pausing only momentarily to question what happens to our customary notion of energy, when its highly systematized philosophical translation (aligning energy with movement) is creatively and productively interrupted. Initially, the paper will communicate a strictly kinematic account of the notion of energy, translated in terms of physical movement within a physical dimension. By defining the conceptual parameters as such, it is anticipated that a less formal reading and categorization of the concept of energy will emerge. Thematically, the paper will consider textual themes from selected writings of Aristotle and Henri Bergson, instances which directly implicate the role of movement in the thought of energy, by orchestrating a dialogue between the two; responding locally in terms of place and rhythm, a reciprocal measure, which simultaneously disturbs the classical intimation of what "energy" is and the representative how of energy.

The way in which a classical representation of the thought of energy conducts itself, by aligning energy with movement ensures that any philosophy of energy has to become responsible for promoting qualitative or substantial images of "an" energy in terms of movement, as well as developing more modal interpretations which are concerned with the form and activity of energy. Thinking energy in this way secures its classical and historical evolution, by actively framing a virtual, and physical dimension, throughout which all "energies" are disbursed temporally and spatially, ontologically generating a "history" by virtue of the tangible spatial-temporal movements of their own futural, progressive trajectories.1
This representation of energy became recognizably conceptualized towards the latter half of the nineteenth century, initially as the result of extensive research into the unproductive effects of bodily (physiological) exhaustion and fatigue.2 The concept of energy directed attention towards the manifestation of a singular and productive force, which ultimately became the dominant trope of scientific materialism. In particular, throughout the spectrum of the physical sciences, the idea of energy personified a universal force detectable "in" all matter, uniting matter with energy. Furthermore, this synthesis was presented as a generative economy or product, capable of self-transformation whilst in essence remaining inalterable and constant. This explicit "organization-by-movement" is fundamental to the way in which the thought of energy evolves and consequently, directly influences the manner in which it is subsequently represented. Therefore, even a basic comprehension of the way in which thought "moves" becomes of paramount importance when establishing how and why a philosophy of energy seems "instinctively" to develop, by complying with the subliminal guidelines of the following paradigm.

Pre-thermodynamic thought is primarily concerned with identifying the form of energy, and then projecting that form as a culmination of spatial and temporal dispersal, contained within a pre-designed fabric, or infrastructure. The structural order exhibited "within," firstly, the thought of energy, and secondly, the locus of energy itself, superficially creates an energetic stability, demonstrating the potency of a singular, generative source of power, ultimately responsible for all movement within and throughout a spatial-temporal arena.3 However, with the birth of the science of thermodynamics, and the flourishing, dynamic yet intransigent relationship between philosophy and the physical sciences, philosophical translation of the concept of energy, deliberately resists the desire qualitatively to identify. Instead, this second progression in the evolution of a history of energy seeks to communicate the "essential" activity and performance behavior of energy, poignantly appropriated in the time-oriented movement of the dispersal of energy, initiating a paradoxical dialogue between modal aspects of movement (progression) and the irreversible, yet natural dissemination of its entropy.4 Alternatively, post-thermodynamic thought removes the idea of energy from being a mere response to questions of quality and modality, by trying to secure a reading of energy in terms of topology, presenting configurations of energetic mobility which resonate, or become vibrant in their residual and dimensional location.

Consequently, an association emerges, connecting the way in which we "think" energy to very distinct sections of its own historical evolution. There is within this scheme, elements of identity (suggesting "what" energy is in a formal sense), activity (suggesting "how" energy behaves) and residualism (suggesting "where" energy can be located) in all of the historical episodes, but at certain times, it is necessary for them to remain silent against the prominent, vocalized thought of the moment. In spite of this, thematically, all representations of energy, whether historical or phenomenological are interchangeable, and depend upon one another for their synthetic unity. This generates and projects our accepted physical notion of energy to be that which is organized by, and aligned to the concept of movement. Therefore, a historical transcript of the thought of energy remains vital, because it diverges from questioning the role of form in philosophical translations, by its very disturbance, to questioning the status of modality within the same model of energetic thought. A complex response between place, energy and rhythm emerges from this questioning, intimated and communicated through a rhythm of energy, a non-synthetic intensity that creatively dispels qualitative and modal tendencies which are to be found in the pattern of categorization which dominates the process of philosophical thought.

A dialogue between movement and energy evolves in Aristotle’s Physics in which the representation of place and deficiency (Book IV) disturbs the progressive movement of the thought of energy, as well as its actual conceptualization as a standard kinematic theory (even though his insights could be deemed as somewhat inaugural in the construction and projection of a classical "history of energy"). However, the following reading expresses rhythm, emerging from the very movement of energy, and the complex interaction between representations of energy and ideas of place.

The representation of movement in this thematic instance is aligned with the potential activity of what is referred to as "natural" energy, an internal source responsible for stimulating and restricting actions of "change" within separate bodies, or distinct forms of matter. The idea of place resonates in this dialogue because it is associated with the most fundamental type of change, "a change of place" confirmed only through the activity of movement. The doctrine of place presented in the text is grounded by the energetic activity of movement, which supports its thematic existence. However, it is within this conceptualization that the idea of place productively disturbs the classical alignment of energy with configurations of movement by subverting the hierarchy of stability from within, to emerge as that which is essentially immobile, yet essentially energetic. This reading derives from attributing quality to the concept of place, equating its structure with an expression of limit, by virtue of the idea that to be defined as "place," it has to exist as the threshold of what it embodies, superficially poised at a limit, whereby "metaphorical" contact with that which it "contains" occurs. This definition of place is lucidly described in the following quotation:

The idea that it contains the object is what makes it plausible to think of shape as place, because the limits of container and contained coincide. It is true that both shape and place are limits, but they are not limits of the same thing. Form is the limit of the object, but place is the limit of the containing body. (Physics IV 211 b10-13)

When translated in terms of movement and energy, this portrays either a body or a form imbued with the potential of movement, so effectively, the impression of place, by way of this definition, determines its existence as something, which is essentially immobile. This subversive, yet playful interaction between movement, energy and place is symptomatic of a more transcendental inquiry, (intuitively divined as opposed to being based in experience) aspiring to formulate a differential equation, which would be capable of theoretically distinguishing the spatial from what can only be considered as attributable to place.

Thematically, the equation appears to be simple in the respect that space has to be different from its occupancy, whereas the notion of place is diametrically supported by ideas of "re-place-ment" (meaning that form moves and changes dimension, "replacing" the position of its previous location) Aristotle projects his doctrine of place as a theory of position, immobile, radically a-temporal, but secure as a position "in time and space," by virtue of the fact that its own physicality, or energy is aligned with the energy of bodily form, receiving "their" energy from the natural inclination of form to move spatially in any one of six directions (above, below, right, left, back and front.) This powerful geometric translation of movement defines form as three-dimensional, by referring to place as something that cannot exist in addition to this dimension. Geometrically, this identity also corresponds to the image of place, as a simple point in time and space, supporting an intuition that place is absolutely singular.

It is evident that the definition of "place" in this reading is supported by notions of shape, matter, spatial interval and dimensional limitation, but more specifically, the idea of place appears in close analogy with the definition of matter, even though it is wholly distinct and separate. Responding to the idea of place in this way ultimately suggests that physically, it exists as the boundary of a bodily enclosure, when, and only when the boundary in question has direct contact with the contained form. Following this premise, if a body or form can move in space and time, its place has to remain structurally immobile. This physical quality refines its identity, which becomes the primary, sedentary boundary of the container, existing as the interior skin of the deepest unmoved vessel of the body in question. However, the attribute of immobility becomes problematic when considering the alignment of energy with movement in a predicated, essentially classical schema of thought. Initially, there can be no guarantee that any given form has an immobile container if space is presumed to be singularly infinite and form otherwise, by virtue of the fact that this would support the idea that the whole material universe may move from one part of space "into" another. However, Aristotle does not conceive of space as something that can be either replete or empty, because any spatial system when understood holistically cannot be subject to moments of physical translation. Nevertheless, even when the conceptual ideas of place and deficiency are removed from this equation, it does little lucidly to explain that what surrounds any given form "may" be in the process of physical translation on account of its positional immediacy. Furthermore, the defining terms of condition which insist that place cannot be larger in dimension than the magnitude of the form it contains, become incompatible with the requirements of immobility.

In this respect, it is convenient to suggest that Aristotle’s doctrine supports a relational view of place and movement, by identifying place as that which is already presumed to exist, namely the inner boundary or limit of a contained form. This relational concept of place naturally travels in the progression of thought to citing "position" as an absolute. However, there is a disparity between the modulatory terms absolute and relational when applied to the idea of place, and it is only the absolute which confirms Aristotle’s concept of movement, presupposing the existence of absolute movement, and ascribing immobility to the notion of place. Nevertheless, the spatial system as a whole cannot relocate or change place (the most fundamental type of movement) but, through the activity of rotation, parts of the structure move from one place to another, which is why the idea of place is attributed to them and not to the spatial system as a whole. The problem with this account, is that it neglects the idea that "nothing" surrounds the spatial-temporal realm, so the "place" of any part of the system can only be identified as such, in relation to other parts of the same system, and since all such parts are constantly moving, there theoretically exists an idea of place which is essentially mobile.

Aristotle’s doctrine of place appears to fall victim to the schematism of thought which aligns energy and movement, if, and when the thought is permitted to proceed typically in this way, presenting a dialogue between movement and energy, throughout which, the idea of place becomes essentially animated. However, Aristotle’s expression of place and deficiency prescribes a bi-lateral reading on divergent levels, whereby, the thought of energy, emergent from "reading" place, resists categorization by actively disturbing not only the conceptualization of energy and movement, but the very energetic movement of the thought process itself. Therefore, the resistance emerges from "within" a classical and highly schematized predication, by virtue of the fact, that place is deemed synonymous with the idea of position. The fixity of this dimension, which pulsates in space and time without being necessarily spatial or temporal, has a prior fundamentality, which is a pre-requisite for its characterization, but upon which its existence is nondependent. The fundamental nature of this dimension secures a notion of physicality which is creatively immobile, communicating an idea of rhythm, responsive to the playful interaction between energy and movement, allowing the representation of energy in the concept of place to be rhythmic as opposed to motion oriented, and more poignantly redefining a pathway of thought which resonates beyond our customary notion of energy and its predicted historical evolution.

The intuition of a rhythm of energy resonating deeply from within the very movement of energy itself, is refined thematically in the philosophy of Henri Bergson, which is exemplified in the following quotation:

That which usually hinders this mutual approach of motion and quality is the acquired habit of attaching movement to elements […] which interpose their solidity between the movement itself and the quality into which it contracts […] Motion becomes then for our imagination no more than an accident, a series of positions […] Indeed we have no choice: if our belief in a more or less homogeneous substratum of sensible qualities has any ground, this can only be found in an act which makes us seize or divine, in quality itself, something which goes beyond sensation […] Its objectivity […] must then consist […] precisely in the immense multiplicity of the movements which it executes, so to speak, within itself as a chrysalis. Motionless on the surface, in its very depth it lives and vibrates. (Matter and Memory, pp. 203-4)

The nonautomatic exploration of the thought of rhythm and energy in this instance, is powerfully regulated by the activity of movement, and conceptualized non-spatially as the temporicity of duration5 (a conceptualization through which Bergson speaks of the very essence of temporality). Consistently, throughout the text, the thought appears to be concerned with the task of understanding the dimension of perceptory movement, and the conscious, yet responsive inclination towards restoring a dialogue between place, energy and rhythm framed within a parameter of movement and its essential attribute of divisibility. This reference however, anticipates, and furthermore gestures towards a rhythm of energy, strongly connected to a concept of movement, in which the activity is considered as a progression, or journey between resting points, a pathway characterized by its essential indivisibility. The polemic between the divisible and what appears to be undivided occurs when sensory perception perceives movement in strictly geometric terms pictured, or depicted as a singularly traversable, straight line. This line emerges to divide infinitely the region it crosses, showing movement to be multiple and divisible when considered in a thought of energy, which is actively implemented in space and in time. Bergson suggests that movement should be regarded as an indivisible whole, and infers that if energy-as-movement behaves as if it is an action which could be divided, it is only an effect of the perceived line apparently crossed, as opposed to the actual effect of the energy of movement (rhythmically translated) which actively crosses it.

The rhythm of energy that resonates deeply from within this guise of movement conducts itself through its own syncopated dimension, travelling by way of intermediate points, which bear resemblance to points of exhaustion, or closure. However, in this syncopation, differences of intensity separate genuine divisions from points of exhaustion as such, in the sense that the latter are necessarily aporetic (impenetrable) by definition, and at which an energetic pulse has no alternative but to be dynamically arrested, whereas at divisible points, "an" energy may continue along its predicted trajectory. Therefore, a rhythm of energy becomes self-referential in form, reconciled with a configuration of movement that is suspended between impenetrable points (aporias) harmonized by their metaphysical immobility. By thinking energy in this way, every point immersed in the spatial-temporal realm appears to be sedentary, and it is extremely difficult not to attribute to this energetic rhythm the quality of immobility. Similarly, when complete movement resumes, it appears that the syncopated energy has stayed an infinitely short time at each and every stage of its "journey-like" trajectory, perpetuating the illusion of a "real" movement. Motion, according to Bergson is "sensation"-ally comprised of the passage between identifiable points, negotiating a spatial arena, the dimension seeming to divide "where" and "when" energy applies itself to the line along which it travels. Therefore, it has to be considered, whether a rhythm of energy is in itself responsible for the construction and simultaneous representation of the line, or whether its characteristic syncopated movement simply crosses the succession of points, which are already there. Although "a" movement seems to convey itself progressively between these different junctures, whilst simultaneously being arrested in each, it is the tendency of thought to wish to substitute the passage for the journey, and because the journey is subtended by a rhythm of energy, the two appear to coincide.

The illusion of what Bergson terms as "real" movement combines acts of progression with the status of immobility. This combination occurs because temporal instants or "moments" can be identified throughout the course of duration, directing the way in which the thought of energy is represented. Formally, the "thought of energy" has an endemic-specific duration,6 and it is within this temporal patterning that an indivisible moment is created, inciting a physical energy to occupy at a precise moment, a certain position in time. Inflections of time (temporicities) may be applied to this concept of energy, by understanding the simplicity of the nature of its form, a simple movement which endures both in space and in time, the rhythmic essence of its duration coinciding with the idiosyncratic indivisibility of the movement in time. The simplicity of this type of movement spatially translates a geometric trajectory (singular line) the extreme limits of which are represented as indivisible terminal or "end" points. If this description of the trajectory of movement inscribed by the application of a rhythmic energy, also measures the duration of this movement (in the respect that a physical movement between two points incurs a certain amount of time), the point at which the line necessarily ends has also to terminate its temporal conceptualization. This allows the point to be quantified as an indivisible of dimension (length) by suggesting that, something, which is temporally indivisible, can arrest energy and movement. Subsequently, the image of a "whole" line symbolizes a completed duration, and so theoretically, a "partial" line must necessarily correspond to images of an incomplete duration, the points of the line complementing moments in actual time, as can be exemplified in the following quotation:

The indivisibles of duration, or moments of time, are born, then, of the need of symmetry; we come to them naturally as soon as we demand from space an integral presentment of duration. But herein lies the error. While the line AB symbolizes the duration already lapsed of the movement from A to B already accomplished it cannot, motionless, represent the movement in its accomplishment nor duration in its flow. And from the fact that this line is divisible into parts and that it ends in points, we cannot conclude either that the corresponding duration is composed of separate parts, or that it is limited by instants. (Matter and Memory, 191)

This powerful geometric translation of movement, depicted as a singular, linear motion represents the "duration already lapsed" of the rhythmic energy along the line, but only as a motion-less insertion unable to represent a complete rhythm, even though the trajectory can be divided, and apparently force respective closure at "end" points, conditioning its own termination. However, this is not to suggest that the corresponding temporicity is actually composed of several parts, or that it can be limited by temporal instants. Bergson infers that this thought of energy systematically departs from genuinely understanding rhythmicity, because it is represented as movement, and sensorial perception dictates to the rhythm, the properties of its trajectory, which are subsequently translated by language in terms of movement and duration, immersed spatially as well as temporally. However, energy can be communicated in terms of rhythm, which is its very essence, and it is this essentiality that seeks restoration in the customary and provincial thought of energy.

Bergson continues by arguing for the existence of "real" movement, denied in "the" accepted thought of energy, where movement is schematized to such a degree that it becomes nothing but a change of distance, the same body is in motion, or completely motionless according to the position of the points to which it is referred, denying not only an absolute movement, but also the essence of rhythm, a sentiment which is expressed in the following quotation:

But if there is absolute motion, is it possible to persist in regarding movement as nothing but a change of place? We should then have to make diversity of place into an absolute difference and distinguish absolute positions in an absolute space […] But can this be imagined or even conceived? A place could be absolutely distinguished from another place only by its quality or by its relation to the totality of space. (Matter and Memory, 194-195)

However, if energy is negotiated in terms of rhythm, the idea of "real" movement becomes an indisputable reality, because energy performs, communicates and functions via its rhythmicity. If it is permissible to allow for the existence of absolute motion, it is also possible to align movement to an economy of translocation, and if this is accurate, diversity of place would have to be identified as an "absolute difference," distinguishing absolute positions in an absolute space. In this respect, the concept of place would have to be represented either in terms of quality or by its relation to, or relative position within, a spatialized economy. According to this hypothesis, Bergson’s composition of space would be heterogeneous, essentially continuous or exist as finite. However, in defining space as a finite composition, another space needs to be identified as its boundary, which presents an image lying beneath heterogeneity, of a foundational and pure homogeneous space. Nevertheless, in both instances, conditioning incites the thought of energy to return to homogeneity and the indefiniteness of the spatial arena, assuming all places to be relative and movement to be absolute, especially in its predicated alignment with the idea of energy.

"Real" movement can be distinguished from relative movement only because it is causally inferred, generating from its own rhythmic energy. For example, if energy applies itself to the line along which it travels, the same point appears, according to the axis to which it is positionally referenced, either at rest, or in motion. The essence of this movement is assured as real only after it has been produced, and so the reality of movement is grasped within a change of state, the difference being absolute. Therefore, real movement is the transference of place, as opposed to a physical or energetic movement. Movements are divisible, distinguished by calculable differences in direction and velocity, as they appear to take place independently in space. However, it needs to be ascertained as to whether real movements present merely differences of quantity, or whether they subsist as intensities of rhythmic quality, internally vibrating, and "beating" time for their own existence through an incalculable number of moments.

The temporicity entertained by the "real" movement of energy has its own determined rhythm, in the respect that any given place can only contain what Bergson refers to as a limited number of phenomena, of which there can be a common awareness. Accordingly, sensory perception can only mediate the effects of an interior and multiple rhythm, effects which are discontinuous, and to which the stability of continuity is added, by virtue of the existence of moments in duration, which can be attributed to the movement-as-energy throughout space, even though the movement in this instance is still positionally referenced. However, beneath the continuity, there needs to exist a network, or field which can be altered to bound any place, renewing and reconfirming the idea of homogeneous space. The rhythmicity that emerges from "real" movement is creative and pauses only to distinguish between two apposite movements. The motion of descent is a preparatory action, whilst its ascending counterpart responds to the immersion of its own inner rhythm, "enduring" essentially, and furthermore imposing this rhythm of energy upon the inseparable motion of descent. The two movements or energies are not diametrically opposed, because the rhythmic activity of ascension maps onto the durational rhythm of descent, providing a continuous background, or field, from which energy is projected, and then re-projected as a temporal rhythm, so in effect rhythm emerges from the temporal duration of energy itself, and exists as that which is essentially immobile.

It becomes apparent, when immersed in the playfully interactive, conceptual dialogue between movement and energy, that a thought of energy becomes responsive in essentially rhythmic terms, which admits to the potentiality of reading energy without its accepted configuration of movement. The rhythmicity, which emerges from the very movement of thought, as well as the thought of movement in both Aristotle and Bergson, partially subverts the classical imagery of energy to be that which relies upon movement for its conceptualization. However, their respective intuitions of rhythm still resonate within an essentially modal framework, which still generates a reading of energy in systematic terms, by necessitating a reverse polarity of status, whereby the thinking of energy in Aristotle becomes highly spatialized by its natural spatial resistance, and similarly, Bergson’s appraisal of energy becomes acutely temporized, or temporal in essence. Nevertheless, by disturbing the classical alignment of movement with energy, from deep within the schema of the thought itself, reading energy, it becomes apparent, metamorphoses into the task of thinking rhythm. In this respect travel towards a suspension of the way in which thought necessarily has to conduct itself to remain "philosophical" becomes possible.

Implicit within the thought, and representation of energy, there appears to be a four-way vector, to which all conceptualization must necessarily return, meaning that any suggestion of energy automatically becomes wedded to implications of either space and time, or dimension and movement. However, occasionally, it becomes possible to present an unsettling of the customary, by disturbing the metaphorical vector, deep from within the somewhat "assuredness" of its constituent terms. This consideration is somewhat symptomatic of a more primal desire to unhinge the way in which the whole thought process is conceived and communicated. However, what is referred to as "philosophy" in a classical sense of the word, confuses itself by using the language of essentially redundant concepts, imaging the transcendence of "boundaries," or "points of origin," and although thought appears to move unrestrained within the terms of these concepts, the internal movement between the language of conceptual expression is still directed spatially and temporally, and so their destruction could never be fully secured. Therefore, instead of trying to establish the existence of new dimensions in which a purity of thought could reside, replete with pure languages, or means of expression at the very limit of thought itself, what is already present and immediate necessitates consideration.

In the introduction to this paper, a question was raised as to whether it would be at all possible for a philosophy of energy to exist autonomously, if energy could be read without movement. In response to this, it has to be suggested that it is possible for energy to be conceived in this way, only by virtue of thinking rhythm, emergent from thinking energy in terms of movement. The dimension of rhythm resonates as a non-modal field, self-constructing and projected from within the subjective resonance of rhythmicity, a consummate immersion that reflects no movement, or temporal and spatial inference, although for the purposes of recognition, the dimension has to procure a place in time and in space, for the thought process in itself is as of yet simply not equipped to deal with what can only essentially remain as "unthought" (something which, for the time being, remains beyond the intuitive scope of this paper). When movement is removed from the conceptual equation, our immediate recognition of "energy" and indeed "philosophy" dissolves. However, by embarking upon the task of thinking rhythm, a thought of energy emerges which effectively silences the philosophical voice, demonstrating that a philosophy of energy cannot exist autonomously as a kinematic principle, because the initial foundations upon which it stands are mutated beyond recognition and verging on the point of dissolution. Similarly, the idea of energy resists any attempt at conceptualization, for it would be superficial to insist that energy simply exists as a complex rhythm.

Nevertheless, there is a mediation in the dysymmetrical locus of the thought of rhythm and the representation of an energy without movement which is characteristic of their non-automatic and non-synthetic engagement. Their relationship prevails as virulent, each gesture invades, mutates and receives, and it is through this viral potential that both independently condition the simultaneous genesis of each other by acting as host and virus at the same time, re-directing, re-informing and re-instating the "thought of energy." The violation of thought does not arise from the action itself, it can be located in the immersion of the conceptual "virus" itself, self-contaminated, and deriving its identity from bi-lateral thought patterns. In this respect, it is never simply a case of one becoming prominent over the other, the resonance is already within, pertaining neither to conditions of exteriority or interiority, and progressing against the notion of the metaphorical power of the inside to "draw-in" from the proverbial outside.

The idea of representing a "mutated" form does not imply the existence of a synthetic unity, the mutation resides as a mimesis, which lends itself to intuitive recognition, and it is suspended within this interval that the aporia of the thought process can be penetrated. Therefore, a mutated form can be located, but not as an all-consuming point of origin, by virtue of the fact that this would imply destination and an acute demarcation of an arena of subsequent activity. Location is by recognition as opposed to the insertion of a conceptual device to precipitate an opening into another dimension which is supposedly "other." The mutation is mimetic because it serves as a simulacra of the aporia immersed within, and it is precisely this simulation which can be inferred to as beside as opposed to "beyond" the current means of philosophical expression. Thematically, there is no movement in the locus of energy and rhythm, because the (un)thought is suspended in a co-existent consistency which pertains neither to spatial or temporal dimensions, but alludes to a domain of creative "play" in which the rhythmicity admits to space and time without feeling the need to introduce formal status or causal inference.

Therefore, concern should be with the pulse within, as opposed to trying to conceptually move "beyond" into an abstract dimension of pure conception, accessible only at the limits of what is coherent and tangible. It is only by recognizing the non-motional vibrancy of the rhythm of energy immersed within the thought of movement, that a genuine rhythmicity can emerge, capable of and persistent, in the task of making "thought" aware of its limitations.

Reference matter

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Deleuze, G. Bergsonism, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberiam, New York: Zone Books, 1991.
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1 The meaning of the word "trajectory" in this instance, and throughout the rest of the paper is strictly physical, and refers to the pathway of movement of any object or medium.
2 Rabinbach, A. The Human Motor, Energy, Fatigue and the Origins of Modernity (University of California Press, 1992), chapter 2, pp. 45-48.
3 In the Principia Mathematica Newton established the existence of universal laws, governing the mechanics of the natural world based upon citing an unexplainable phenomenon as axiomatic and unquestionable (in this instance, the laws of inertia). In his Opticks, Newton claimed in Question 31 that of physical processes such as heat, magnetism and combustion, "there is no natural process, which would not be produced by these active forces-attractions and repulsions-that govern the motion of the stars and that of freely falling bodies..." (Prigogine, I. and I. Stengers: Order Out of Chaos, Man's New Dialogue with Nature, Flamingo Press, 1984, pp. 28-29.)
4 The science of thermodynamics deals with the behavior of macroscopic (as opposed to microscopic) phenomena, and was initially developed through the research of scientists Black, Carnot, Clausius, Boltzmann and others with the advent of steam power in the nineteenth century and the performance of heat engines. Theoretically, the discipline sets out the relationship between heat and work, explaining how heat can be exchanged with, or converted into energy. The second law of thermodynamics shows that in any physical process, energy is expended as heat, and irreversibly lost. This irreversible loss is measured by the quantity of entropy-a name given to the measure of the capacity to change (Coveney, P. & Highfield, R. The Arrow of Time, Flamingo Press, 1991, pp. 32-33).
5 Bergson's definition of "duration" varies thematically between texts. For the purpose of this paper, it is read as the intuition of time, which is heterogeneous, and essentially continuous, as opposed to the idea of homogeneous time, which as a medium of duration can be divided into periods of equal length.
6 "Endemic-specific" duration in this respect indicates a time unique to, and perpetuated by the medium itself. In technological terms, this would represent the "processal time" of machinery.